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I. INTRODUCTION
Uber, Lyft, and other transportation network companies
(“TNCs”),1 have garnered a great deal of attention in the media and
popular press for the efficiencies of their service, their “disruptive”
business models, and their labor practices.2 Uber has almost 400,000
drivers in California and Massachusetts alone.3 Other TNCs have
countless drivers of their own, and TNCs have become especially pop-
ular in densely populated cities.4 Gone are the days when one needed
to hail or flag down a taxi, or call a dispatcher to request one. Now
customers can summon TNC drivers using “apps” on their
smartphones, and TNC platforms match them with available drivers,
who arrive in personal vehicles.5 Many customers prefer this system
for reasons of promptness and convenience, and the apps also allow
them to track drivers via GPS “and thus to have a better sense of
scheduling the trip.”6 Uber and other TNCs have made obtaining a
ride considerably more efficient, cheaper, and more convenient for
many customers.
In fact, TNCs have been described as a transportation revolution,
changing the way taxi fares are provided and the way ordinary people
routinely get from place to place.7 Uber as a corporation has been
quite successful, attracting billions of dollars in investment from ven-
ture capitalists and quickly expanding its ridesharing businesses to
1. This article uses the term “TNC” but also at times uses “Uber” or “uber” in
different ways. Uber is indeed the market leader for ridesharing apps, and it may fall
into place with terms like “kleenex” and “xerox” where the brand name becomes so
ubiquitous that the term is then used to refer to the generic product or process.
2. See, e.g., Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Essay, Navigating the Uber
Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016) (examining doctrinal tests for em-
ployee and independent-contractor status in the context of the Uber litigation).
3. This was the approximate size of the class certified in the O’Connor v. Uber
lawsuit. Davey Alba, Judge Rejects Uber’s $100 Million Settlement with Drivers,
WIRED (Aug. 18, 2016, 8:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/uber-settlement-re
jected [https://perma.cc/J9SF-STFX?type=image].
4. David Johnson, See Where Uber Faces the Biggest Competition, TIME (Nov. 21,
2014), http://time.com/3598873/uber-alternatives [https://perma.cc/BY6E-G3HT].
5. Sara Thornton, Comment, The Transportation Monopoly Game: Why Taxi-
cabs Are Losing and Why Texas Should Let Transportation Network Company To-
kens Play, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 893, 895 (2015); see How to Request a Ride, LYFT,
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213584098-How-to-Request-a-Ride [https://
perma.cc/3VY2-JD2W]; Ravi Mahesh, Note, From Jitneys to App-Based Ridesharing:
California’s “Third Way” Approach to Ride-for-Hire Regulation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
965 (2015).
6. Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of
Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 580 (2016).
7. See Katy Steinmetz, How Uber and Lyft Are Trying to Solve America’s
Carpooling Problem, TIME (June 23, 2015), http://www.time.com/3923031/uber-lyft-
carpooling [https://perma.cc/Z9DY-8PMD].
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many cities.8 To “uber” is now a verb, meaning “[t]o arrive at a desti-
nation via ridesharing service.”9
As a company, Uber has also proven itself litigious, using some of
the money it has raised through investment to defend itself in litiga-
tion with municipal governments over regulatory issues, litigation with
its workers over employee status, and various other legal matters.10
Uber also now has a meta-meaning that encompasses a number of its
distinct business practices, such as lowering labor costs by using “inde-
pendent contractors,”11 managing workers by algorithm,12 and cutting
inefficiencies and middlemen through technology.13 Many have noted
that Uber has an aggressive attitude of “asking forgiveness” rather
than “asking permission” of local authorities as its business expands.14
Thus, when people say they will “uber” a problem, they could mean
seeking solutions from the crowd, using technology to improve solu-
tions, taking humans out of the equation, or expanding rapidly—per-
haps without permission.
8. See Kevin Kelleher, What Uber’s Massive New Investment Really Means, TIME
(June 1, 2016), http://time.com/4354575/uber-saudi-investment [https://perma.cc/
WU8D-BWTN]; Johnson, supra note 4. R
9. Judy Greenwald, Uber (oo-ber) Verb: To Arrive at a Destination via Ride-Shar-
ing Service, BUS. INS. (Apr. 10, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://businessinsurance.com/article/
20160410/NEWS06/304109970/1238 [https://perma.cc/JJ3A-5FL2]; see also Bryan
Heater, Uber and Lyft Try to Get Out the Vote, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 4, 2016), https://
techcrunch.com/2016/11/04/uber-and-lyft-election [https://perma.cc/223B-7AZH]
(demonstrating broader use of the technology).
10. See Lucas E. Buckley et al., The Intersection of Innovation and the Law, WYO.
LAW., Aug. 2015, at 36 (“Attacking highly regulated industries, acting without permis-
sion, and tweaking essential components may be helpful strategies for creating a com-
petitive edge and revolutionizing an industry. However, these same factors are – not
surprisingly – magnets for litigation.”).
11. Stephen Gandel, Uber-nomics: Here’s What It Would Cost Uber to Pay Its
Drivers as Employees, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/
17/ubernomics [https://perma.cc/HY5P-AZW6].
12. Tom Simonite, When Your Boss Is an Uber Algorithm, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec.
1, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/543946/when-your-boss-is-an-uber-algo
rithm/ [https://perma.cc/F23V-27VB].
13. Jason Abbruzzese, Uber Isn’t a Savior for Drivers Any More than Amazon Is
for Authors, MASHABLE (May 28, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/05/28/uber-drivers-
salary-not-sustainable/#QWH1QQW0ikq6 [https://perma.cc/D6KH-AKC8].
14. E.g., Aarti Shahani, As Uber Expands, It Asks Cities for Forgiveness Instead of
Permission, NPR (Dec. 26, 2014, 3:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechcon
sidered/2014/12/26/373087290/as-uber-expands-it-asks-cities-for-forgivness-instead-of-
permission [https://perma.cc/HA3W-FGQK]. Sometimes this strategy has worked in
Uber’s favor, like with municipal governments that do not want to disturb a service
already in operation and deemed to be worthy. But in other situations, Uber’s aggres-
sive stance has backfired. Austin, Texas, for instance, held a referendum on the regu-
latory terms by which Uber was operating. In response, Uber threatened to pull out
of the city altogether rather than abide by the rules that would be set out in the vote.
Perhaps offended or angered by these threats, Austin’s citizens voted in favor of the
regulations and Uber promptly pulled the plug on operations. See Richard Parker,
Opinion, How Austin Beat Uber, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/05/12/opinion/how-austin-beat-uber.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2EYR-
8ME8].
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Meanwhile, commentators have written numerous in-depth articles
about the Uber phenomenon,15 its financing,16 its executives,17 its way
of doing business,18 its treatment of workers,19 its role in the on-de-
mand economy,20 its technology,21 and other Uber-related topics.22
Likewise, as Uber has generated litigation and other controversy, law-
review coverage of the company and its business practices has prolif-
erated. Topics have included Uber’s clashes with local regulators,23 lit-
igation with drivers over employee versus independent-contractor
status,24 tort-law responsibility for accidents and insurance,25 anti-
competition law,26 and the company’s business practices more gener-
15. E.g., Rob Lever, Uber Steers Anti-Taxi Idea to Become Global Phenomenon,
YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/uber-steers-anti-taxi-idea
-become-global-phenomenon-065836340.html?ref=GS [https://perma.cc/4MEA-
KB9B].
16. E.g., Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 632–36 (2016); Paresh Dave, Has Uber Maxed Out on
Private Financing?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016, 4:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/busi
ness/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-funding-ipo-20160801-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/
9YD2-2CU2].
17. E.g., Biz Carson, You Know Travis Kalanick. Meet the 23 Other Power Players
of Uber, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2016, 1:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
power-players-of-uber-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/734E-6CJS].
18. E.g., Heesun Wee, The Uber Business Model Loses Some of Its Sheen, CNBC
(Mar. 29, 2016, 1:43 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/on-demand-business-
model-looses-some-of-its-sheen-.html [https://perma.cc/6BTU-AQN8]; Ajay Deep,
How Uber Works: Insights into Business & Revenue Model, JUGGERNAUT (Sept. 24,
2015), http://nextjuggernaut.com/blog/how-uber-works-business-model-revenue-uber-
insights [https://perma.cc/7BJS-B78C].
19. E.g., Rebecca Smith, It Won’t Kill Uber to Treat Drivers Like Employees, FOR-
TUNE (June 19, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/19/it-wont-kill-uber-to-
treat-drivers-like-employees [https://perma.cc/H5YQ-BXYH].
20. E.g., Means & Seiner, supra note 2; Adam Lashinsky, Why Uber Personifies
the Best of the On-Demand Economy, FORTUNE (Mar. 16, 2016, 8:37 AM), http://
fortune.com/2016/03/16/uber-on-demand-economy [https://perma.cc/C2MC-2CXZ].
21. E.g., Kate Abrosimova, Be Like Uber – Build Like Uber. What Is the Uber
App Made From?, YALANTIS: BLOG, https://yalantis.com/blog/uber-underlying-tech
nologies-and-how-it-actually-works [https://perma.cc/X2WT-QXYH].
22. E.g., id.
23. E.g., Boris Bindman, Note, Keep on Truckin’, Uber: Using the Dormant Com-
merce Clause to Challenge Regulatory Roadblocks to TNCs, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 136 (2015); see also Caleb Holloway, Comment, Uber Unsettled: How Ex-
isting Taxicab Regulations Fail to Address Transportation Network Companies and
Why Local Regulators Should Embrace Uber, Lyft, and Comparable Innovators, 16
WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 20 (2015) (discussing the regulation of
TNCs).
24. E.g., Means & Seiner, supra note 2; Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 98–101 (2015).
25. E.g., Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett, Note, When “Disruption” Collides with Accounta-
bility: Holding Ridesharing Companies Liable for Acts of Their Drivers, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 233 (2016); Jennie Davis, Note, Drive at Your Own Risk: Uber Violates Unfair
Competition Laws by Misleading UberX Drivers About Their Insurance Coverage, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1097 (2015).
26. E.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); Re-
becca Elaine Elliott, Note, Sharing App or Regulation Hack(ney)?: Defining Uber
Technologies, Inc., 41 J. CORP. L. 727 (2016).
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ally.27 Various commentators have alternatively hailed Uber as an in-
credibly efficient transportation provider,28 a boon for consumers,29 a
terrible result for workers,30 an exploiter or arbitrageur of the legal
system,31 and an opportunistic bully.32
This Article largely eschews easy or reflexive judgments about Uber
or other TNCs. In this piece, the Author asks two questions about the
economic, social, technical, and political aspects of TNCs and their
interactions with the law. First, are Uber and TNCs the future of
transportation (and transportation law)? And second, are Uber and
TNCs the future of employment (and employment law)? In a com-
mon-law system, reasoning from precedent is always a form of predic-
tion. As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, “[t]he prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.”33 But answering these questions is more than a legal is-
sue. Such predictions depend on analyzing not just legal precedents
but also social and economic trends. Predicting the future, especially
of technology, is always a risky and fraught task. Yet drawing on
trends we can see developing now, portions of the “uber” business
model are here to stay, while other parts are unlikely to remain.
II. TNCS AS THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION (AND
TRANSPORTATION LAW)
Using the Texas A&M Changing Landscape of Transportation Sym-
posium as a backdrop, let us first turn to the transportation-law com-
ponent. In this regard, the presentations at the symposium were
revealing, especially to the Author as someone who has not tradition-
ally been focused on researching transportation law.34 Other
presenters focused on fascinating new transportation technologies that
are either being employed or are under development, such as Ama-
zon’s delivery drones, smart cities and traffic control, electric vehicles,
flying vehicles, semi-autonomous vehicles and truck convoys, and ul-
27. E.g., Joshua M. Mastracci, Comment, A Case for Federal Ride-Sharing Regula-
tions: How Protectionism and Inconsistent Lawmaking Stunt Uber-Led Technological
Entrepreneurship, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 189 (2015).
28. See, e.g., id. at 193.
29. See, e.g., Holloway, supra note 23, at 32.
30. E.g., Jack Smith IV, Uber Drivers Are Scrambling to Make Ends Meet After
Latest Fare Cuts, OBSERVER (Feb. 9, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://observer.com/2015/02/
uber-drivers-are-scrambling-to-make-ends-meet-after-latest-fare-cuts [https://
perma.cc/GM5D-79XA]; Rogers, supra note 24, at 101–02.
31. Rogers, supra note 24, at 87.
32. Holloway, supra note 23, at 32–39.
33. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61
(1897).
34. While the Author has written previously on Uber and the on-demand econ-
omy, as in Part III, she has typically approached it from the angle of labor law and
adjusting to a new way of working. In contrast, this Part focuses mainly on the impact
of Uber on the way we travel and the application of transportation law.
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tra-high-speed rail. All of these technologies were presented as trans-
portation “solutions” for the future—solutions to various and diffuse
problems that current users, providers, and policymakers have identi-
fied when grappling with transportation issues.35
Some of the problems discussed included overuse of, and depen-
dence on, traditional fuels that contribute to global warming; unsafe
modes of transportation that lead to high incidences of casualty and
fatalities; the slowness of various modes of transportation; inconve-
nience and high costs to consumers; and transportation bottlenecks
that slow down the provision of services. All of these are valid and
important concerns, yet they are also intractable and complicated. It is
important to note that some of the technologies mentioned in the pre-
vious paragraph focus on only solving one of the listed problems and
do not address the others at all. In fact, some of these proposed solu-
tions might fix one problem, but potentially exacerbate another.
For example, building more roads—a solution mentioned during
the symposium—might assist with bottlenecks and result in less time
wasted in traffic. But at the same time, it might stimulate or increase
the use of private cars and lead to more pollution and greenhouse-gas
emissions. Other technologies, like the flying car, might serve con-
sumer convenience—but would likely use far more energy and further
increase emissions.
On the bright side, some technologies discussed at the symposium
could “kill two birds with one stone.” For example, semi-autonomous
cars and truck convoys might increase safety, with far fewer accidents
due to driver negligence, inattention, or lack of skill—while at the
same time reducing fuel consumption. Ultra-high-speed rail would not
only lead to energy-saving and quick transport, but would also help
ease transportation bottlenecks. Thus, in terms of the future of trans-
portation, we must think more deeply about which of the proposed
technologies seem not only to be the most convenient, but which also
appear to focus the most on the values and goals that seem wisest to
pursue.
And so, given the various problems identified at the symposium and
the fact that some solutions may only target one or two of these
problems, it is wise to think about the values and goals embodied and
promoted by the use of Uber and other TNCs. Some of these goals
and values are extremely positive and community-minded, but others
are less so. In the late 2000s, the so-called “sharing economy” began
as a way for neighbors to assist each other and to engage in more
35. See, e.g., Juanita Bernal Sanint, Uber: An Effective Transportation Solution,
SOLKES, http://www.solkes.com/uber-an-effective-transportation-solution [https://
perma.cc/Y5XF-WZUS] (describing the corrupt and monopolized public transporta-
tion system in Bogota´, Colombia, to which Uber offers an attractive alternative—if it
can break through the red tape).
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sustainable modes of production.36 Rather than ownership, partici-
pants in the sharing economy were interested in gaining access to re-
sources that would be held in common as shared resources.37 Based
on models of community volunteerism and pooled assets, such as
lending libraries and tool collections, the sharing economy sought to
reduce consumption and increase access to resources.38
Online ridesharing companies sprang up to do just that by facilitat-
ing neighbors sharing rides. For example, early commercials for Lyft
showed neighbors assisting their friends and neighbors without cars,
making it more feasible to exist without cars in areas that were al-
ready jammed with traffic.39 Perhaps with an inexpensive and more
convenient alternative to cabs, a resident would not need to add yet
another car to the streets in places like San Francisco and would in-
stead be able to rely on public transportation and bikes, with the occa-
sional helping hand from a ridesharing service. The sharing economy
was seen as a “green,” more sustainable choice that avoided excess
consumption, such as additional cars and the space they take up.40 The
idea of giving others rides within the community and helping out one’s
neighbors was akin to volunteerism; payments were to help out with
the cost of owning and garaging cars in the Bay Area, but were not
intended to be sufficient to allow full-time employment as a driver.41
As the years went by, however, the model evolved from one of true
“sharing,” where perhaps neighbors took turns swapping rides or saw
it as a way to find a ride or carpool in the morning, into one not much
different from that of taxicabs or private car services. These days,
Uber and Lyft are solidly for-profit businesses and, in fact, are aggres-
sively so.42 Rather than encouraging average people to volunteer their
36. See Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The LEGAL Landscape of the Sharing
Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 3–4 (2012).
37. See JANELLE ORSI & EMILY DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION: HOW TO
SAVE MONEY, SIMPLIFY YOUR LIFE & BUILD COMMUNITY 8–9 (2009).
38. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.
economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy
[https://perma.cc/A4NV-9JHB].
39. E.g., Maureen Morrison, Lyft’s First Big Ad Campaign: We’re Not Just a
Transportation Service, We Create Community, ADVERT. AGE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://
adage.com/article/digital/lyft-launches-national-campaign/296819 [https://perma.cc/
L4VK-4QK3] (describing Lyft’s attempt to “differentiate itself by offering a combina-
tion of ‘humanity and technology’” and providing a video showing a Lyft commercial
set in the San Francisco Bay Area); Lyft, What Is Lyft?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2bQdf408T8 (explaining how Lyft works and
noting that you meet new friends and community members in using it); Lyft, Lyft
Community Solutions: The Price We Pay, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=OhOrD-Kkt5E (noting that the company has increased opportuni-
ties for the disabled and those residents who live without a car).
40. Cherry, supra note 6, at 579. R
41. Id. at 579–80.
42. See Brian Solomon, Lyft: We’re Closing In on Uber with a ‘Path to Profitabil-
ity’, FORBES: TECH (May 12, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolo
mon/2016/05/12/lyft-were-closing-in-on-uber-with-path-to-profitability [http://web.
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cars on the odd chance they feel like it every few weeks on the way to
work, Uber encourages drivers to be available to work for extended
periods (the equivalent of “shifts”) and at inconvenient times so that
dedicated customers are not stuck without rides.43 Another hallmark
of present TNC services is the “on-demand” nature of the rides, and
many customers rave about the convenience of services like Uber and
Lyft compared to slow or inefficient taxi services.44 With a TNC, one
can determine from looking at a smartphone where the nearest driver
is and how long a commute will take, unlike with traditional telephone
dispatch or the random and unsystematic idea of “hailing” a cab in a
large city.
Looking at their overall development, we should ask about the val-
ues and goals TNCs advance and which particular transportation
problems they attempt to solve. In the beginning, when Lyft marketed
and promoted itself as a “sharing” service, perhaps one of its most
important goals was to promote a green alternative to individual pri-
vate-car ownership. Car ownership not only generates extra trips that
result in fuel consumption, but it also means needing a place to park
and store a car in a city with little available space. Thus the goals of
TNCs at that early “sharing” point would have been environmental-
ism, by lessening of emissions and fuel consumption; eliminating
transportation bottlenecks by cutting down on the number of cars on
the road; and reducing inequality by making car rides more affordable
to those who could not afford to own and garage a car in the city. As a
byproduct of all of this, the mobile apps came to be seen as much
more consumer-friendly and convenient than conventional processes
of obtaining a taxi.
In the past few years, the problems that TNCs are tackling have
changed along with the shifts in their business models. Rather than
emphasizing the environmental perspective, or that neighbors are
pitching in to help each other with rides, TNCs like Uber and Lyft
have shifted into providing what amounts to a new taxi service that
seeks loopholes in existing regulations.45 It is not clear if TNCs would
be competitive if they had to incorporate regulations and compliance
into their business models. TNCs presently capitalize on the conve-
archive.org/web/20161014124429/http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/05/
12/lyft-were-closing-in-on-uber-with-path-to-profitability/#6ceafd3f772a].
43. See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Is Uber’s Surge-Pricing an Example of High-Tech
Gouging?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.: IT’S THE ECONOMY (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-an-example-of-high-tech-gouging
.html [https://perma.cc/7JS2-6E9N] (discussing Uber’s price surging during a snow-
storm and on New Year’s Eve to increase the supply of drivers to meet rider demand).
44. See, e.g., Melena Ryzik, How Uber Is Changing Night Life in Los Angeles,
N.Y. TIMES: FASHION & STYLE (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/
fashion/how-uber-is-changing-night-life-in-los-angeles.html [https://perma.cc/SWY3-
4HEL] (“Taxis here were often unreliable . . . but ride shares are always just a swipe
away.”).
45. See Cherry, supra note 6, at 580–81. R
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nience of their services and the idea that there is less waiting involved.
Fares are also set to be lower than those charged by traditional taxi-
cabs.46 Thus, at the present time, reduced customer cost and increased
convenience (through the ease of use of the mobile app) seem to be
the main aims of TNCs.
A. Regulation and Run-Ins with Local Government
In addition to more recent litigation by drivers, it is important to
note that some of the original opposition to, and litigation involving,
TNCs came from existing cab drivers and local governments that ar-
gued TNCs required regulation. With drivers largely unlicensed to op-
erate taxis or for-profit car services, there have been safety concerns.47
However, Uber has largely brushed these concerns aside, adopting an
aggressive litigation stance.48 As an example, the Metropolitan Taxi
Commission in St. Louis originally refused to let Uber operate in the
city limits because of a lack of background checks for drivers; Uber
then sued the Taxi Commission in federal court, alleging antitrust vio-
lations.49 The Taxi Commission has in return brought a lawsuit seek-
ing to enjoin Uber’s operations, and Uber was also sued by individual
taxi drivers in St. Louis.50 Undaunted by the ongoing litigation, Uber
defiantly continues operations in the city.51
In some cases, TNCs will even lobby state and local governments or
propose “model codes” to allow operations without being subject to
the regulations applicable to taxi services. For instance, Uber has
hired more than twenty lobbyists to ensure “favorable treatment” in
the Texas Legislature.52 And in Eugene, Oregon, Uber has argued
that city regulations do not apply to TNCs because they “are funda-
46. Laura J. Nelson, Uber and Lyft Have Devastated L.A.’s Taxi Industry, City
Records Show, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/
lanow/la-me-ln-uber-lyft-taxis-la-20160413-story.html [https://perma.cc/L2UU-4E5S]
(“Uber’s per-mile rate is lower than that of taxis, which have their rates set by city
officials.”).
47. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Govern-
ment Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
901, 922–23 (2015).
48. See Bindman, supra note 23. R
49. For a summary of the tortured story of Uber in St. Louis, see Leah Thorsen, St.
Louis Area Taxi Drivers File Suit Against Uber, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 16,
2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-area-taxi-drivers-file-suit-
against-uber/article_f2c2a69f-90cb-58a6-b513-d122cb6189cd.html [https://perma.cc/
4552-4JTC].
50. Id.
51. See Linda Chiem, Uber Beats St. Louis Taxi Drivers’ Suit over Fingerprint
Regs, LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/849717/uber-
beats-st-louis-taxi-drivers-suit-over-fingerprint-regs [https://perma.cc/25Z6-MYYC].
52. Bill Lambrecht, Uber Fights Pushback on Ride Service with Politics, HOUS.
CHRON. (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/hous
ton/article/Uber-fights-pushback-on-ride-service-with-politics-6109354.php [https://
perma.cc/U9G9-BU2S].
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mentally different from existing taxi companies” and has proposed a
“model code” allowing it to operate in the city without adhering to the
regulations.53
One set of commentators has predicted that these so-called “sharing
wars,” in which local governments litigate or bar TNCs and other on-
line platforms and TNCs must lobby for laws allowing their opera-
tions, are just a phase until acceptance and even eventual
encouragement of these services by municipalities occurs.54 Noting
that the presence of a service like Uber or AirBnB helps a city be-
come more attractive to tourists and visitors, Daniel Rauch and David
Schleicher note that on-demand providers will become crucial to mar-
keting and promotion efforts.55 It may be that TNCs and other plat-
form providers become indispensable in the future because of their
ubiquity. And perhaps local and municipal governments will not only
embrace these services, but even request them to take over services
that are not presently particularly efficient or consumer-friendly.
However, to suggest that TNCs in their present form could somehow
substitute for public transportation seems problematic, if only because
of the sheer volume of rides offered. If a major goal is to reduce the
environmental footprint of transportation, then TNCs cannot be seen
as a substitute for public transportation.
B. Taxicabs with Better Communications? Or Something More?
How the legal system views TNCs is also an open question. Courts
that have considered the issue have declined to view TNCs as
“software companies,” instead noting that labor in the provision of
transportation is an important part of all TNC business models.56 In
other words, without drivers using their cars and providing rides, the
software that runs on mobile apps is not particularly valuable. If TNCs
are strictly taxicabs with better communications, then perhaps they
should not be considered “the future” of transportation or transporta-
tion law.
But there is some indication that Uber is playing the “long game”
apart from its first-mover advantage in new markets by becoming a
player in the autonomous-vehicle space.57 Given that fleets of autono-
53. E.g., Gordon Friedman, There’s an Uber Problem in Eugene, DAILY EMERALD
(Feb. 26, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.dailyemerald.com/2015/02/26/theres-an-uber-
problem-in-eugene/ [https://perma.cc/QJ3Q-WNQM].
54. See, e.g., Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 47.
55. See id. at 945–47.
56. AJ Dellinger, California Court Cracks Down on Uber’s Claim That Its Drivers
Aren’t Employees, DAILY DOT (June 17, 2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/
debug/uber-drivers-employees-contractors-california/ [https://perma.cc/FS8M-ZW83];
see Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal
Worker Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 102 (2017).
57. Mike Ramsey & Douglas Macmillan, Carnegie Mellon Reels After Uber Lures
Away Researchers, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://www.wsj.com/arti
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mous vehicles that respond to the summons of a smartphone are
under development, why even bother with independent contractors?
Why not dispense with drivers altogether? Perhaps, then, TNCs are a
type of “weigh station” towards autonomous vehicles, rather than an
end in and of itself. Uber as both a TNC and a provider of autono-
mous vehicles would be an incredibly ambitious undertaking.
The other way TNCs may become part of the future of transporta-
tion would be if they could reconnect with their roots (routes?) in the
sharing economy. If TNCs are viewed as providing solutions that go
beyond customer convenience and speed, they stand a more likely
chance to endure. This is already happening through the rollout of
services like UberPool.58 With UberPool, algorithms help set out a
path in which the driver navigates in such a way as to be able to pick
up and drop off multiple, overlapping passengers in a single trip.59
And in Europe, the company BlaBlaCar facilitates carpooling with
passengers paying towards car upkeep but no more.60
Uber is additionally working on functions in the area of package
delivery.61 If along a delivery route a driver can also pick up paying
passengers, that not only increases profitability, but also means that
fewer trips are being taken and more fuel is being conserved. Doub-
ling taxicabs as delivery vehicles could also lead to more cars being
taken off the road. And if the vehicles used for these delivery and
shuttle services become autonomous, it is possible that traffic safety
will be increased further. Imagine—self-driving vehicles summoned by
cell-phone apps with routes planned for maximum efficiency to ac-
commodate multiple passengers and delivery of goods—helping usher
in a world where few people own their own cars and no one drives. Of
course, certain laws, even beyond those regulating taxi services, would
need to change to accommodate this future and all of this is very un-
certain. At the present moment, TNCs do not do much to solve the
cles/is-uber-a-friend-or-foe-of-carnegie-mellon-in-robotics-1433084582; see Clive
Thompson, Uber Would Like to Buy Your Robotics Department, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/magazine/uber-would-like-to-
buy-your-robotics-department.html [https://perma.cc/9YUV-SWBK].
58. uberPOOL: Share Your Ride and Save, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/
uberpool [https://perma.cc/LN7N-JNZZ]; Farhad Manjoo, Car-Pooling Helps Uber
Go the Extra Mile, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/
technology/car-pooling-helps-uber-go-the-extra-mile.html [https://perma.cc/X9DK-
PD6H]; see also K. Casey Strong, Comment, When Apps Pollute: Regulating Trans-
portation Network Companies to Maximize Environmental Benefits, 86 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1049, 1071 (2015) (discussing potential environmental benefits of TNC
carpooling).
59. See Manjoo, supra note 58.
60. How Do I Set My Price?, BLABLACAR, https://www.blablacar.in/faq/question/
how-do-i-set-my-price [https://perma.cc/83NF-K247].
61. See How It Works, UBERRUSH, https://rush.uber.com/how-it-works [https://
perma.cc/A4LM-SCRU]; Biz Carson, Uber Finally Unleashes Its FedEx Killer, Uber
Rush, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-
rush-fedex-killer-released-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/EY6C-RDSG].
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transportation problems of the twenty-first century. Instead, TNCs
seem like nothing more than ultra-efficient taxi services that provide
cheaper rides and increased customer convenience.
III. TNCS AS THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
(AND EMPLOYMENT LAW)
The second question for discussion is whether Uber is the future of
employment and employment law. In Beyond Misclassification: The
Digital Transformation of Work, the Author argued “that we are cur-
rently experiencing a far-reaching digital transformation of work,” in-
cluding changes such as growth in automatic management,
globalization, and more precarious work.62 The fact that these changes
have been engendered largely through changes in the transportation
industry is somewhat ironic, as the factory assembly line also had its
origins in transportation—specifically in the automotive industry.
[In the early 1900s,] Frederick Taylor further refined the decon-
struction of work through so-called scientific management. So-
called “Taylorism” sought to calibrate each worker’s actions to
achieve the highest level of efficiency. . . . [Henry] Ford wanted a
stable and loyal workforce, and in order to get that, he had to pay
higher wages to those performing repetitious and occasionally haz-
ardous tasks.
The shift to a knowledge-based, information-rich economy at the
end of the millennium also engendered a shift to a new model of
work. Some of the characteristics of the new digital work described
by [Katherine] Stone are an increased emphasis on worker knowl-
edge, training and skills. The digital era, as Stone defines, refers to
mid to late twentieth century, when computers and the internet be-
came “the central nervous system of global production networks.”
Based on a shift towards fluid workplaces and permeable borders
between firms, the digital model places a high value on the intellec-
tual capital of employees. Gone was the idea of a “life cycle” model
of employment. Instead, workers had shorter job tenure, and were
expected to advance by moving horizontally across different firms.
Worker loyalty, having been eroded by mass layoffs and movement
of manufacturing jobs overseas in the 1980s, was instead replaced by
the notion of “employability.” . . .
Other characteristics of this new digital model included the flat-
tening of organizations and subtracting middle management. As
workers are hired for their knowledge and expertise, their employ-
ment often was centered around a certain project or projects. While
employment might not last beyond a particular project, workers
were often promised opportunities to enhance their skills to provide
motivation. . . . Job changes and moves are common in this new
digital model of work. . . . [Because of this, Stone] especially calls
for legal reform around the issue of noncompetition clauses, which
62. Cherry, supra note 6, at 579. R
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prevent workers from using their skills and their network for rival
firms.63
Subsequently, the new “gig” or “sharing” economy has arisen, in-
cluding the TNCs that are the focus of this Article. Work in the gig
economy and the common problem of employee misclassification will
be discussed in the next Section.
A. Work in the “Gig” Economy and Worker Classification
Millions of people work in the “on-demand,” “gig,” or “sharing”
economy.64 These “crowdworkers” work via websites and apps, in-
cluding those for Handy,65 Amazon Mechanical Turk,66 Instacart,67
and the TNCs that are the focus of this Article.
[However, t]hese new companies’ labor practices have sparked in-
tense litigation in the United States. Currently, these [disputes] are
focusing on a common doctrinal issue – whether the workers in the
platform, on-demand economy have the status of employees or in-
dependent contractors. The question of employee status is particu-
larly important because many of the rights and benefits provided for
in U.S. employment law (minimum wage, protection from discrimi-
nation, unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation) are only
triggered for those who are deemed to be “employees.”68
[W]hether a worker is an employee or independent contractor is
determined through various multifactored tests dependent on the
facts of the relationship. The “control” test derives from the caselaw
and decisions on agency law, and focuses on a principal’s right to
control the worker. . . . [S]ome of the factors for finding employee
status are whether the employer may direct the way in which the
work is performed, determine the hours involved, and provide the
employee with direction. On the other hand, elements that lean to-
ward independent contractor classification include high-skilled
work, workers providing their own equipment, workers setting their
63. Id. at 595–96 (footnotes omitted) (quoting KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 5
(2004)) (first citing FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT 31 (1911); then citing STONE, supra, at 34–36; then citing Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); and then citing STONE, supra, at 44–45,
92, 96, 74, 111, and 127–56).
64. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll [https://perma.cc/6R5X-
PZTC]; see also Cole Stangler, December Jobs Report: How Many Gig Economy
Workers Are There, Really?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016, 7:33 AM), http://www.ib
times.com/december-jobs-report-how-many-gig-economy-workers-are-there-really-22
55765 [https://perma.cc/LB2J-MRWM].
65. Popular Services, HANDY, http://www.handy.com/services [https://perma.cc/
PA5C-M8GF].
66. Welcome, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/wel
come [https://perma.cc/T3WY-L7BH].
67. Groceries Delivered in 1 Hour, INSTACART, https://www.instacart.com [https://
perma.cc/MT2S-FTZ8].
68. Cherry, supra note 6, at 578. R
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own schedules, and getting paid per project, not per hour. In an
alternate test, courts examine the economic realities of the relation-
ship to determine whether the worker is exhibiting entrepreneurial
activity, or whether the worker is financially dependent upon the
employer. The label affixed to the relationship is a factor in the out-
come, but it is certainly not dispositive. In any event, the tests are
notoriously malleable, even when dealing with what should be a
fairly straightforward analysis.69
Under the control test, with TNCs some factors lean more towards
drivers being “employees,” while others lean more towards drivers be-
ing “independent contractors.”70 For instance, drivers have flexibility
in setting their own schedules—they may sign on and off apps more
easily than workers in traditional environments who work set shifts or
are otherwise tethered to desks or factory floors may clock in and
clock out. Similarly, drivers may choose to work part time, full time,
or anywhere in between. They use their own vehicles, cell phones,
computers, and Internet connections. Moreover, drivers are labeled as
“independent contractors” in the companies’ end-user license agree-
ments (“EULAs”) that are sent over mobile apps and the Internet.71
Conversely, many factors support a finding that TNC drivers are
really employees. Control may be quite high, with Uber using a “star”
customer-rating system to almost constantly monitor drivers—creat-
ing an interesting situation where customers, rather than actual man-
69. Id. at 581–82 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal
Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Work-
places and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251,
257–58 (2006); then citing Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161
F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1998); then citing Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of
Employment: Labor Law Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L.
REV. 661, 663 (1996); then citing Stone, supra, at 257–58; and then citing Richard R.
Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It
Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001) (“Indeed, in
the case of employee status, the law encourages ambiguity. On the one hand, employ-
ers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment relationship. On the
other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers who are plausibly not
employees motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable “non-employee” classi-
fication. It is not uncommon to find employees and putative contractors sitting side by
side, performing the same work without any immediately visible distinguishing char-
acteristics. And the trend of the working world is toward greater complexity and vari-
ation, driven partly by the temptation to capitalize on the fog that obscures the
essence of many working relationships.”) (internal citations omitted)).
70. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 98–99.
71. Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig
Economy: A Comparative Approach 7 (St. Louis Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 2016-15, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847869.
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agers, are essentially deputized to supervise workers.72 Also, these
companies often implement intricate quality-control policies.73
Looking at the broader economic-realities test, which is typically
used to analyze employee status under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”),74 drivers’ opportunities for entrepreneurship—and with
them risk and reward—are barely present, if at all. Additionally, driv-
ers are often low-skilled workers who can be easily exploited and are,
thus, among “those that are most in need of FLSA protection.”75 Fi-
nally, even if the EULAs used by TNCs label drivers as independent
contractors, they are standard-form adhesion contracts that are often
construed against drafters.76
B. Specific Cases
The debate over misclassification has sparked litigation, especially
in the Northern District of California, where TNC drivers have filed
multiple suits claiming to be “employees” and seeking minimum-wage
and overtime protections under the FLSA.77
Perhaps Judge Vince Chhabria said it best when he noted in rul-
ing on a motion that “the jury . . . will be handed a square peg and
asked to choose between two round holes. The test . . . courts have
developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers isn’t very
helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem[.]”
72. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116482, at *70–72 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (amended order granting in part and deny-
ing in part plaintiffs’ motion for class certification); Jeff Bercovici, Uber’s Ratings Ter-
rorize Drivers and Trick Riders. Why Not Fix Them?, FORBES: TECH (Aug. 14, 2014,
12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/08/14/what-are-we-actually-
rating-when-we-rate-other-people [http://web.archive.org/web/20160514014908/http://
www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/08/14/what-are-we-actually-rating-when-we-
rate-other-people/#652e75d469e4].
73. Miriam A. Cherry, Gig Economy: Settlements Leave Labor Issues Unsettled,
LAW360 (May 5, 2016, 10:26 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/791341/gig-econ
omy-settlements-leave-labor-issues-unsettled [https://perma.cc/WQ98-EGUT].
74. Nan S. Ellis, Work Is Its Own Reward: Are Workfare Participants Employees
Entitled to Protection Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 12 (2003).
75. Cherry, supra note 6, at 583.
76. See Anthony C. Eichler, “Owning” What You Buy: How iTunes Uses Federal
Copyright Law to Limit Inheritability of Content, and the Need to Expand the First
Sale Doctrine to Include General Assets, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 208, 217 (2016)
(explaining that a similar EULA used by iTunes is an adhesion contract because con-
sumers “must accept the terms as they are, or they cannot use iTunes,” just as TNC
drivers can either accept terms as they are or not drive).
77. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012); see, e.g., Mike
Isaac, Judge Overturns Uber’s Settlement with Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/technology/uber-settlement-california-drivers.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/8UL7-VXMP]; Joanna Szabo, Uber FLSA Lawsuit Added by
California Judge, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Oct. 7, 2015), https://topclassactions.com/law
suit-settlements/lawsuit-news/177809-uber-flsa-lawsuit-added-by-california-judge
[https://perma.cc/4AZJ-24BC].
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. . . Cotter v. Lyft . . . settled on January 27, 2016, with Lyft pledg-
ing to pay a settlement of $12 million to its drivers. In addition, the
company agreed to provide drivers with additional due process
rights before termination. As is the case with many settlements, it
was a compromise for both sides. While workers did not receive the
employee status they had been seeking, the settlement at least pro-
vided some compensation; the drivers can no longer be “deacti-
vated” from their accounts without going through a grievance
process heard by an arbitrator.78
However, Judge Chhabria rejected this settlement as inadequate
and instead ordered additional negotiations.79 Another settlement of
$27 million was reached, and we are currently awaiting a final ruling
from the court about the adequacy of this second agreement.80
A similar story seems to be playing out in another case—O’Connor
v. Uber.81 The most high-profile TNC case, it has received significant
media attention.82 A class had been certified and the case was set for
trial in summer of 2016.83 However, on April 21, 2016, a settlement of
up to $100 million was reached.84 Although that seems like a large
amount, after payments to attorneys and “the division over the sheer
number of workers, some drivers [would] only recover small or nomi-
nal payments.”85 As with “the Lyft settlement, the question of
whether the workers are misclassified” was left for future resolution.86
However, also like the Lyft settlement, the Uber settlement was re-
jected by Judge Edward Chen as being inadequate, and as of the writ-
ing of this Article, the parties are continuing negotiations.87
78. Cherry, supra note 6, at 583 (alteration in original) (quoting Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.
(Cotter I), 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order denying summary judg-
ment)); see also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc. (Cotter II), 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 937–38 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (order denying preliminary approval of class action settlement) (discussing the
agreed-upon arbitration requirement).
79. Cotter II, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 931–32.
80. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc. (Cotter III), No. 13-cv-04065-VC, 2016 WL 3561742, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (order granting preliminary approval of class-action set-
tlement) (concluding that the revised settlement agreement was “fair, reasonable, and
adequate”); Elizabeth Weise, Lyft Settles with California Drivers for $27M, USA TO-
DAY (May 12, 2016, 6:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/05/11/lyft-
agrees-27-million-settlement/84257158 [https://perma.cc/6SVW-YNZ9].
81. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order
denying defendant Uber’s motion for summary judgment).
82. E.g., Cyrus Farivar, Uber Settles Class-Action Labor Lawsuits in Massachusetts,
California, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:57 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-pol
icy/2016/04/uber-settles-class-action-labor-lawsuits-in-massachusetts-california/ [https:
//perma.cc/G9ZM-974R].
83. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271,
at *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (order denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
approval).
84. Id. at *4.
85. Cherry, supra note 6, at 583–84.
86. Id. at 584.
87. See O’Connor, 2016 WL 4398271, at *1; Alba, supra note 3; Isaac, supra note
77.
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Regardless of the monetary outcome, the result of the negotiations
will likely be disappointing for those who hoped for a resolution or
precedent-setting decision regarding employee status.
Meanwhile, a Florida state appeals court has upheld an agency deci-
sion labeling Uber drivers as independent contractors for the purpose
of determining eligibility for reemployment assistance.88 However,
this decision only concerns Florida unemployment law. Moreover,
regulators in other states have classified at least some TNC drivers as
employees for the purpose of determining eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits.89
Regardless, since many cases that might have provided rulings on
this issue have settled, or likely will, and the tests for determining
worker status are so malleable, even before adding platform work into
the equation, there is no way to be certain how courts will decide
these issues in the future. Also, returning to the regulatory context,
federal agencies like the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) or the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) could determine on their
own initiative that TNC drivers are employees.90 This could have a
wide range of impacts on TNCs—from tax consequences from the IRS
to the NLRB giving drivers the right to unionize.
C. Lobbying and Model Codes
Although this matter has not received nearly as much attention as
the previously discussed litigation, Uber also has been engaged in
widespread lobbying to change the terms of various state and local
codes, as discussed previously in Section II.A. While such codes make
sense from the perspective of wanting drivers to have insurance and
meet minimum licensing requirements, the company has also included
provisions dealing with labor laws, including language that defines its
workers as independent contractors.91 However, such legislation may
not have much meaning for worker status since each statute (such as
the FLSA and those creating unemployment and worker’s compensa-
tion) has its own individual definition of “employee”92 and state-law
88. McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, No. 3D15–2758, 2017 WL 438423
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).
89. E.g., Sonja Sharp, Uber Drivers Secure Unemployment Benefits, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-drivers-secure-unemployment-benefits-1476405341
(last updated Oct. 14, 2016, 9:27 AM).
90. For an example of a tax case where liability was also imposed by the IRS for
employee misclassification, see Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1008–09
(9th Cir. 1997).
91. See Jon Weinberg, Gig News: Uber Successfully Pursuing State Legislation on
Independent Contractor Status, ONLABOR (Dec. 11, 2015), https://onlabor.org/2015/12/
11/gig-news-uber-successfully-pursuing-state-legislation-on-independent-contractor-
status [https://perma.cc/Q64V-G8DA].
92. Contingent Workers, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/
dunlop/section5.htm [https://perma.cc/A8EY-FATH]; see, e.g., Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT
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definitions of these terms do not directly impact federal law. There-
fore, having another definition randomly inserted in state transporta-
tion codes will likely not be dispositive of the issue, despite Uber’s
efforts.
D. Fit Within Industrial or Digital Model
How do TNCs fit within the industrial or digital model? Many
would classify the development of TNCs (and crowdwork generally)
as simply an outgrowth of the digital-knowledge-work model, as
TNCs are intermediated by technology in the form of cell-phone ap-
plications. TNC drivers work by the “project,” with each ride typically
lasting only a fraction of an hour. And “breaking down tasks to their
lowest common denominator is” not at all new—“it is paradigmatic
Taylorism.”93 The following analysis focuses on two features of the
crowdwork model utilized by TNCs: automatic management of work-
ers and “precarity.”
1. Automatic Management
A salient feature of crowdwork infrastructure is the predomi-
nance of code in mediating work relations. The literature refers to
this process as automatic management or “algocracy.” Indeed, a
new trend is that algorithms are absorbing many organizational
functions that managers traditionally would perform. Computer
code may perform a variety of supervisory tasks from the mundane
to the sophisticated: assigning tasks to workers, speeding up work
processes, determining the timing and length of breaks, monitoring
quality, ranking [workers], and more. Code makes crucial on-the-
spot decisions about individualized employees and what they need
to be doing in real time. Labor practices that used to be run through
bureaucracy (and other organizational control regimes) are becom-
ing embedded within computer programs. Workers are directed by
imperatives programmed into the algorithms, which replace the
traditional external schemes carried out by managers.94
Uber also embraces the idea of automatic management. Rather
than conduct background checks, having a dispatch system, or spot
checks by supervisors, Uber has essentially outsourced its quality
control to its passengers. Upon the completion of a ride, passengers
SHEET #13: AM I AN EMPLOYEE?: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2014), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/
whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3ZC-ZRMA].
93. Cherry, supra note 6, at 596; see STONE, supra note 63, at 34–36 (describing
Taylorism).
94. Cherry, supra note 6, at 596–97 (footnote omitted) (citing A. Aneesh, Global
Labor: Algocratic Modes of Organization, 27 SOC. THEORY 347 (2009) (explaining
“algocracy” and differentiating it from traditional bureaucracy)); see also Aneesh,
supra, at 354–55, 367 (“While code may not always succeed in organizing work as
intended . . . its usefulness in explaining . . . the decline of bureaucratic hierarchies is
significant.”).
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are asked to rate their driver on a scale of one to five, with five stars
as the best score. The ratings are then averaged in order to provide
a composite score.95
If a TNC driver’s customer-satisfaction rating drops below a speci-
fied average, he or she is essentially terminated from the platform and
can no longer access the app.96 The current threshold an Uber driver
must achieve so as not to be “cut off” is very high—over four out of
five stars, but this is not made clear.97 Some have alleged these ratings
could at times reflect conscious or subconscious racial or religious bias
and thus be problematic—possibly even under anti-discrimination
laws (not just those pertaining to employment, but also those pertain-
ing to public accommodations, since drivers also rate passengers).98
Automatic deactivation or, in starker terminology, “firing by al-
gorithm” has unsurprisingly been so poorly received by drivers that
the Lyft and Uber settlements discussed previously in this Article both
addressed it, granting drivers the right to arbitration hearings.99 Under
these proposed settlement provisions, Uber and Lyft were no longer
free to fire workers with a simple deactivation of their accounts.100
95. Cherry, supra note 6, at 597 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Elizabeth Dwos-
kin, At Uber, the Algorithm Is More Controlling than the Real Boss, WALL ST. J.:
DIGITS (Nov. 4, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/11/04/uber-as-employ
er-the-boss-is-an-algorithm [http://web.archive.org/web/20160724005140/http://
blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/11/04/uber-as-employer-the-boss-is-an-algorithm]; then cit-
ing Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries:
A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3758, 3772–76 (2016)); see also
Driving with Uber: A Closer Look at Ratings, UBER, https://www.uber.com/info/
driver-ratings [https://perma.cc/RL9S-ZKAF]; Driver and Passenger Ratings, LYFT,
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213586008-Driver-and-Passenger-Ratings
[https://perma.cc/A7YH-T23D].
96. Driving with Uber: A Closer Look at Ratings, supra note 95; Driver and Pas-
senger Ratings, supra note 95.
97. See Samantha Allen, The Mysterious Way Uber Bans Drivers, DAILY BEAST
(Jan. 27, 2015, 4:55 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/27/the-myste
rious-way-uber-bans-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/MJ47-GCH7] (describing the un-
certainty surrounding exactly when Uber may “deactivate” a driver).
98. E.g., Noah Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Gig Economy Discrimination
Outside Employment Law, ONLABOR, (Jan. 19 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/01/19/
beyond-misclassification-gig-economy-discrimination-outside-employment-law
[https://perma.cc/V5EB-ULRG]; Nancy Leong, Uber, Privacy, and Discrimination,
NANCY LEONG (April 20, 2014), http://www.nancyleong.com/race-2/uber-privacy-dis
crimination [https://perma.cc/E8T7-RS9J]. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some passengers
are shocked to learn that they have low ratings and some have wondered if this is due
to racial or ethnic bias by drivers. See id.
99. See Cotter II, 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 937–38 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (order denying
preliminary approval of class action settlement); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., Nos.
13-cv-03826-EMC, 15-cv-00262-EMC, 2016 WL 3548370, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 30,
2016).
100. See Cotter III, No. 13-cv-04065-VC, 2016 WL 3561742, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June
23, 2016) (order granting preliminary approval of class action settlement); O’Connor,
2016 WL 3548370, at *3. “Of course, establishing industrial due process does undercut
the idea that Lyft drivers are independent contractors, and regardless of what the
settlement says, another governmental or regulatory agency could decide that these
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However, even if such firings were not permitted without some sem-
blance of due process, what does this mean for the “control” test dis-
cussed previously? Is the future of employment law one in which
“control” includes effective “control” by customers?
2. Precarious Labor
Understanding the growth of crowdwork also requires attention
to a second trend: the expansion of precarious labor. By “precari-
ous,” scholars are referring to labor that is more than just part-time
and temporary. The notion encompasses a deeper undercutting of
reliability and security in labor systems. Arne Kalleberg discusses
precarious work as work that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky.
Stone also refers to work that has no explicit promise of continuity.
This notion of precarious work spans the range of occupations . . .
from fast food service, to retail worker, to engineering consultants.
Kalleberg charts dramatic trends. Through precarious labor sys-
tems, we are seeing an increasing likelihood of unemployment, a
growth of general job insecurity, expanding contingent and nonstan-
dard work, and risk-shifting (that is, the transfer of labor expenses
like health insurance and pensions from the employer to the em-
ployee). Impacts on the daily lives of workers can be problematic.
For working parents, the rise of “just in time” scheduling means dif-
ficulty in arranging childcare.101
TNC drivers also face temporal chaos and pressure. Rides can be
canceled with little to no notice—even by a customer simply not being
present when a driver arrives to pick him or her up. When customers
cancel rides, both Uber and Lyft drivers may be able to receive cancel-
lation fees, but the drivers may still lose significant fee income and be
forced to eat the costs.102 Moreover, drivers who arrive even five min-
utes late, perhaps due to no fault of their own, may forfeit the right to
this income.103 This is in addition to the competiveness present and
methods of worker surveillance used in the crowdwork model. Drivers
must not only earn high customer-satisfaction ratings, but must also
worry about the scores other drivers are earning, since they are con-
stantly expected to out-achieve and out-score each other.104
workers are employees, notwithstanding the settlement.” Cherry, supra note 6, at 598
n.110.
101. Cherry, supra note 6, at 598 (footnote omitted) (citing Arne L. Kalleberg, Pre-
carious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition, 74 AM. SOC.
REV. 1 (2009)).
102. Brian, Updated Cancellation Policy, UBER: NEWSROOM (May 1, 2012), https://
newsroom.uber.com/updated-cancellation-policy/ [https://perma.cc/NM8K-5FLL];
Cancellation Policy for Passengers, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/
214217177-Cancellation-Policy-for-Passengers [https://perma.cc/FF8S-XHYH].
103. Brian, supra note 102; Cancellation Policy for Passengers, supra note 102.
104. See Thornton, supra note 5, at 920, 930–32 (2015) (noting that the TNC feed-
back system makes for a form of self-regulation).
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With TNCs, work only lasts as long as each ride that arrives through
the app. Compounding the issues of instability, TNC drivers do not
receive traditional employee benefits along the lines of sick days, ben-
efits, or reimbursements. Drivers may also spend significant time trav-
eling from passenger to passenger, and, since there is competition for
every job, they must be quick to beat competitor-drivers.105 Essen-
tially, the Uber model “is a return to industrial (or even pre-industrial
in terms of its pay by the piece and work at home) systems.”106
E. A New Model?
There are fundamental differences between these models in the
construction of the labor and its conditions. While the industrial
model had a modicum of stability and secure remuneration, and ar-
guably the digital model had some of these features as well, the
crowdwork model is marked by rapid job fluctuation of tasks, decreas-
ing authority of worker, a decrease in skill required and along with it
decreasing remuneration. The impact of precarity, especially within
the context of information technology, is striking in crowdwork. If the
digital era broke schedules down into part-time or project-based
shifts, crowdwork breaks those schedules down even further into the
micro-level. It moves from “project” based work (with coherent aims
and stages) occurring over a duration of weeks, months, or years, into
“task” based work (the purpose of which may not ever be explained
to workers) occurring in just hours, minutes, or seconds. . . .107
Additionally, many digital-era advantages are weaker or even com-
pletely nonexistent in the crowdwork model. Gone are investments in
training. Gone is the security of stable or predictable work, along with
living, or perhaps even minimum, wages. With automatic manage-
ment, employees have little in the way of discretion over tasks, and
there is almost no communication between employees and supervisors
who can train or coach them to improve. There are also few to no
requirements for, or systems of, due process, and there are few to no
opportunities for advancement—these are what sociologists have
termed “bad jobs.”108
Some might point out that, however bad these “jobs” are, at least
they still exist. But if autonomous vehicles catch on, as seems increas-
105. See LINDA TIRADO, HAND TO MOUTH: LIVING IN BOOTSTRAP AMERICA
(2014) (also describing, among other challenges, that of working multiple jobs with
precarious hours and schedules).
106. Cherry, supra note 6, at 601.
107. Id. at 600; see also Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/business/31digi.html
[https://perma.cc/A2CM-EMBV] (describing task-based work).
108. Franc¸oise Carre´ et al., Job Quality: Scenarios, Analysis and Interventions, in
ARE BAD JOBS INEVITABLE? TRENDS, DETERMINANTS AND RESPONSES TO JOB
QUALITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 2 (Chris Warhurst et al. eds., 2012).
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ingly likely,109 making a living by driving a vehicle may not be an op-
tion several decades from now. And it is true that some of these
transportation services could perhaps be provided more efficiently
and safely by machine—compare driving with the system for piloting
flights, which is extremely safe and is less subject to human error
thanks to technologies like autopilot.110 However, the idea that a job
may become outdated or outmoded in the future does not excuse poor
treatment of the worker who is doing that job now.
TNCs like Uber and Lyft may ultimately be “weigh stations,” par-
tial pieces on the road towards establishing autonomous vehicles.
However, the employment model that TNCs and other crowdwork
platforms rely upon may be more long-lasting. The shared characteris-
tics of deskilled tasks, that are arranged gig to gig and are facilitated
and intermediated through algorithms, are all hallmarks of not just the
TNC model, but of some forms of crowdwork. Regardless of whether
100 years from now there are still human drivers, the Author predicts
that work will still be coming to individuals via their smartphones (or,
possibly more likely, smartphones’ successors) and that many of us
will work by a process that does not seem like work; but rather like
other everyday pursuits or even leisure activities. Will the resulting
changes in the structure of work result in maximum flexibility and
more time for family, civil society, and leisure pursuits? Or will the
gains from the technology flow unevenly to those who own the plat-
forms? Difficult choices in terms of extending old regulations to these
new forms of work will need to be made. Regardless, in the meantime
decent work must be made a priority for TNC drivers and all precari-
ous workers.
IV. CONCLUSION
TNCs could be doing more to innovate and solve transportation
problems other than convenience and ease of customer service, in-
cluding genuinely facilitating carpools and green initiatives to reduce
fuel usage and emissions. If TNCs were to pursue such goals, they
might better reflect the original green and community-oriented vision
for the “sharing economy.”
Regardless of the development of autonomous vehicles, the
crowdwork model pioneered by TNCs will have staying power. The
Author predicts that the on-demand model is a more permanent de-
velopment than perhaps even the existence of TNCs themselves. Situ-
ated in the cross-current of precarious work, automatic management,
and deskilling, crowdwork as currently formulated presents a bleak
109. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the
United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411 (2014).
110. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: HOW OUR COMPUTERS ARE CHANG-
ING US 43–50 (2014) (discussing the evolution of autopilot and suggesting that relying
on automation may, at times, be safer than relying on human pilots).
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and disturbing picture for the future of work. But by recognizing the
factors that lead us to consider crowdwork as problematic, perhaps we
can then begin the work that needs to be done to extend basic protec-
tions and regulate for decent work.
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